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OPINION* 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
Appellant Jenzack Partners, LLC appeals the District Court’s order applying the 
federal statutory interest rate to a consent judgment resolving a contractual dispute.  
Jenzack urges us to reverse the District Court and hold that the underlying contracts 
provide the applicable post-judgment interest rate.  Because the District Court’s order 
was not final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we will dismiss Jenzack’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
I.  
On January 25, 2007, Appellees REMI Capital, Inc., and Erik A. Kaiser, REMI’s 
president, entered into certain financing agreements with Sovereign Bank to obtain a $15 
million line of credit, including a guarantee and promissory note providing a prime 
 
 *  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
______________  
______________  
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interest rate1 plus six percent on the loan amount before and after entry of a judgment. 
REMI became insolvent and was unable to pay the required amounts under the 
loan agreements.  Sovereign Bank then sent REMI a default notice and demanded 
payment of the entire balance, including unpaid interest.  Because REMI did not make 
any payments following the default notice, Sovereign Bank filed a complaint against 
REMI and Kaiser on April 3, 2009.  One year later, Sovereign Bank filed a motion for 
summary judgment. 
While the motion was pending, the parties came to an agreement, which the 
District Court entered as a consent judgment on September 1, 2010.  The consent 
judgment holds REMI and Kaiser jointly and severally liable for $1,560,430.24.  
Sovereign Bank assigned its right, title, and interest in the consent judgment to Jenzack 
on July 16, 2012.  Following a dispute on the remaining balance, Kaiser filed a motion to 
declare the consent judgment satisfied pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(5).  On September 24, 2018, the District Court denied Kaiser’s motion without 
prejudice2 and set the post-judgment interest rate at the federal rate of 0.26%, as 
determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).  Jenzack filed a notice of appeal on October 17, 
2018. 
 
1  The agreements define the prime rate as “the rate of interest designated by the 
Bank from time to time . . . [which] may not be the lowest rate of interest from time to 
time charged by the Bank to its customers.”  App. 39. 
 
2  Although the District Court was not explicit, we will construe the order as 
denying Kaiser’s motion without prejudice.  The District Court stated that it was denying 
the motion “at this time . . . until the remaining discovery issues are resolved.”  App. 10. 
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II. 
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This 
Court has “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”  § 1291 
(emphasis added).  We have plenary authority to consider our own jurisdiction.  Papotto 
v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. 
Jenzack appeals the District Court’s conclusion that § 1961, rather than the 
underlying contracts, provides the applicable post-judgment interest rate.  We can only 
reach that issue if the District Court’s order is final under § 1291, so we begin with that 
threshold question.   
A. 
This Court dismisses cases for lack of jurisdiction when “[t]he District Court’s 
order is not final under § 1291.”  Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 2017); 
see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (“The effect of 
[§ 1291] is to disallow appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or 
incomplete.”).  We focus on an order’s practical effect when considering finality.  See 
Penn W. Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 123–24 (3d Cir. 2004).  Central to our 
analysis is whether the “decision will fully resolve all claims presented to the district 
court” and whether “there will be nothing further for the district court to do” once the 
“decision has been issued.”  Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 
(3d Cir. 1997).  These considerations are meant to avoid piecemeal litigation.  Adapt of 
Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 364 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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Relying on Torres v. Chater, 125 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1997), Jenzack points out that 
orders denying Rule 60(b) motions are generally final and appealable.  However, orders 
denying Rule 60(b) motions that are interlocutory are typically not appealable under § 
1291.  Penn W. Assocs., 371 F.3d at 123 (“[I]f the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion is 
itself interlocutory, we normally do not have appellate jurisdiction to review that 
denial.”).  Orders entered without prejudice are generally interlocutory.  See Lui v. 
Comm’n on Adult Entm’t Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 324 (3d Cir. 2004).  But we may 
review an interlocutory order denying a Rule 60(b) motion that “has the effect of 
wrap[ping] up all the matters pending on the docket.”  See Penn. W. Assocs., 371 F.3d at 
123–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The District Court’s order is interlocutory because it allowed further discovery and 
delayed final disposition on the remaining amount to satisfy the consent judgment.  See 
In re Carco Elecs., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that discovery 
orders are not final orders . . . for purposes of obtaining appellate jurisdiction under [§ 
1291].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Based on the available information, the 
District Court concluded that it “cannot determine the amount remaining” and denied the 
motion “at this time . . . until the remaining discovery issues are resolved.”  App. 10 
(emphasis added).  As a result, the District Court ordered that REMI and Kaiser “may 
serve [d]iscovery on Plaintiff Sovereign Bank to determine the status of” any amounts 
owed under the consent judgment.  Id. (emphasis added). 
Jenzack cites Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986), in 
support of the proposition that an order dismissing a post-judgment motion without 
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prejudice, while discovery was pending, can nonetheless be final.3  We are not convinced 
that Ohntrup is dispositive because it involved a post-judgment order denying a motion to 
withdraw that “completely settled the question of [counsel’s] withdrawal” and had 
nothing to do with the pending discovery proceedings.  See id. at 677–78.  Here, the 
District Court permitted discovery proceedings because it was unable to determine the 
heart of the matter, the amount owed on the consent judgment.  Discovery was integral to 
resolve the main issue that remained. 
To bolster its claims regarding finality, Jenzack next argues that the District 
Court’s order is dispositive on the applicable post-judgment interest rate.  Unlike the 
order in Ohntrup, this order resolves an issue that is bound up with outstanding discovery 
proceedings.  The District Court cannot calculate the amount remaining on the consent 
judgment without settling past payments and the total interest owed.  These are key 
variables in an unfinished calculation that demand further discovery.  We cannot 
conclude that the District Court issued a final order that “dispose[d] of the whole 
subject.”  Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 
 
3  Jenzack also references a Tenth Circuit decision holding that the “post-trial 
discovery order” at issue “became final and non-interlocutory at the very latest when [the 
plaintiff] was sanctioned for not complying.”  Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc., 243 F.3d 1221, 
1227–28 (10th Cir. 2001) (expressing the concern that “a post-trial discovery order would 
never be appealable until a party complies”).  We are not convinced that Rodriguez is 
applicable to this case.  As far as we are aware, there have not been any sanctions for lack 
of compliance with discovery requests.  Furthermore, it is our expectation that Kaiser will 
renew his Rule 60(b)(5) motion once discovery is complete.  In fact, he averred to this 
Court that he intended to renew his motion after receiving discovery from Santander 
Bank (Sovereign Bank’s successor-in-interest).  He was unable to do so because 
Jenzack’s appeal divested the District Court of jurisdiction over the proceedings. 
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1993); see also Aluminum, 124 F.3d at 557 (noting that a final decision “will fully resolve 
all claims presented to the district court”).  Indeed, rather than fully resolving Kaiser’s 
claims, the District Court merely deferred a final ruling on his motion. 
We do not have jurisdiction to consider Jenzack’s appeal because the District 
Court’s order is not final.  Jenzack did not file a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the 
District Court’s interest rate determination or a Rule 69 motion to execute the consent 
judgment once Kaiser declined to pay beyond the federal interest rate.  Instead, it appeals 
the denial of a Rule 60(b)(5) motion that was entered without prejudice and explicitly 
called for additional discovery.  That order still leaves much for the District Court to 
resolve.  The outstanding issues related to discovery, the remaining amount, and total 
interest owed on the consent judgement precluded the District Court from making a 
definitive determination on Kaiser’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion.  Since the order is not final, 
we are left without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
B. 
While we do not have jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s application of § 
1961 as the post-judgment interest rate, it is imperative that Jenzack not be denied 
meaningful appellate review.  We urge the parties to act expeditiously on any outstanding 
discovery.  Because the District Court denied Kaiser’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion without 
prejudice, Kaiser is free to renew his motion once discovery is complete.  Once Jenzack 
collects payment up to the consent judgment amount plus the federal interest rate, Kaiser 
will presumably move to declare the consent judgment satisfied, which would 
subsequently result in a final and appealable order under § 1291. 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Jenzack’s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
